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Abstract: The paper takes a closer look at cultural festivals such as musical or operatic festivals. From an
economic viewpoint the paper shows that such festivals offer great artistic and economic opportunities, but that
at the same time these opportunities are also easy to destroy. Empirical evidence from the Salzburg Festival
show that government support can have negative effects on the innovative and economically success of festivals
by introducing distorting incentives and imposing all sorts of restrictions. The paper draws policy suggestions on
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I. The Boom in Festivals
Virtually every city, or at least region, in Europe has its own musical or operatic festival.
While the festivals at Bayreuth, Salzburg, Glyndebourne, or Spoleto may be older and more
in the limelight than others, there are many thousands of festivals today1. Due to the problem
                                                
1 Only festivals devoted to serious music and operas are considered here. But even so, exactly what a music
festival is, is ill-defined. There are, of course, many other types of “festivals”, ranging from country music
to jazz, theatre, circus or films. A classification is e.g. provided in Getz and Frisby (1988). Economists have
tended to ignore art festivals as a general phenomenon; they have confined their attention to the local and
regional multiplier effects of festivals (see, e.g., Vaughan 1980 for the Edinburgh Festival, Mitchell and
Wall 1989 for the Stratford (Ontario) Festival, or O’Hagan 1992 for the Wexford Opera Festival), to the
welfare theoretic implications of subsidization (e.g., O’Hagan and Duffy 1987; Pommerehne 1992), or to
2of how to define a music festival, no precise count exists; rough estimates range from one
thousand (Pahlen 1978, Dümling 1992) to at least two thousand (Galeotti 1992). A detailed
study by Rolfe (1992, p. 2) lists not less than 529 music festivals in Europe. Even in tiny
Denmark, roughly 45 festivals take place every year. An enumeration for France counts 864
festivals, of which 40 percent are devoted to serious music (Maillard 1994, p. 65). Another
source lists 600 festivals, of which 450 are devoted to serious art (L’Expansion 1994, p. 32).
An official publication by the French Ministère de la Culture comes up with 245 festivals of
serious music and opera for 1994.
Festivals became a significant part of the serious music and opera scene in the 1920s but the
real boom took place within the last 20 years. When the official “Association Européenne des
Festivals” was founded in 1952, there were 15 members as opposed to 58 now. Clearly, this
Association is very restrictive and limited to the most prestigious festivals. In its special issue
on musical events, L’Expansion (1994, p. 32) estimates, for example, that 6 out of 10 festivals
in France have been founded in the 80s. Festivals usually take place in summer and are often
very popular. Some festivals are permanently sold out and entrance tickets can then only be
acquired by good connections, or on the black market. The most famous example is the
Salzburg Festival, where ordinary visitors have to apply several times before they are able to
purchase (a restricted number of) tickets.
The boom in music festivals stands in glaring contrast to the financial depression in which
opera houses, orchestras and art museums find themselves. Many opera and concert houses
are under such intense financial strain that they are forced to cut down their activities, dismiss
artists, stage hands and other employees (if they are legally allowed to do so), or risk closing
down completely. Unit labor costs of production in the live performing arts (or more
generally in the service sector) steadily increase because the wage rates in this sector are
rising at a rate similar to that in the economy as a whole, while labor productivity in the arts is
more or less constant. This is the essence of the so-called Cost Disease. As a result, the live
performing arts of opera, concert and theatre are faced with a secular threat of survival
because of continually increasing cost
                                                                                                                                                        
specific festivals (see, e.g., Frey 1986 for the Salzburg Festival; Galeotti 1992 for the Spoleto Festival).
Previous work by the author on the economic analysis of festivals; see Frey 1994, 1996, Frey and Busenhart
1996, as well as on subsidies to the arts in general, Frey and Pommerehne 1989, Frey 1999, 2000.
3relative to other consumption activities2. The relevance of the Cost Disease has been
challenged for various reasons. In particular, if demand rises more quickly than that for other
outputs (the income elasticity is larger than one), and the price elasticity of demand is larger
than minus one, prices and revenues can possibly be raised sufficiently to keep pace with
rising costs. In addition, labor productivity may to some extent be increased by switching to
different art forms, for instance the use of chamber rather than symphony orchestras (Peacock
1984; Baumol and Baumol 1984), or by reducing the travel time of itinerant performers
(Baumol 1993). The basic idea has, however, been generally accepted and provides a
convincing explanation for why live performing arts suppliers are in perennial financial
difficulties, and why many of them have not been able to survive.
But why is there such a boom in music festivals though they also produce live performing arts
and should therefore run into the same financial problems as the established venues?
There are indeed major differences between festivals and established venues which serve to
explain why the former are booming while the latter face perennial problems. Section II
discusses factors on the demand side, and section III on the supply side. While festivals have
a considerable potential to be artistically innovative and economically successful there is a
constant danger that government intervention undermines this potential by introducing
distorting incentives and imposing all sorts of restrictions. Section IV illustrates this tendency
with the example of the Salzburg Festival. Section V suggests ways of how festivals can be
kept lively and innovative.
II. Demand
The following features highlight the special conditions festivals experience with respect to the
demand for their services:
1. High income effect. Consumers tend to spend an increasing share of rising income on
visiting musical performances. Scattered empirical evidence exists, suggesting that
econometrically estimated income elasticities of demand are greater than one. Throsby and
Withers (1979, p. 113), for example, find an income elasticity for performing arts services
                                                
2 The analysis of the Cost Disease is due to Baumol and Bowen 1966, and is sometimes also called Baumol’s
law. Major contributions to the large subsequent literature on the topic are included in Towse (1997).
4of 1.55 for the United States 1949-73, and of 1.4 for Australia 1964-74 (full income). This
means that the expenditures for the performing arts rise by 15.5 percent, and 14 percent,
respectively, when the population’s disposable income rises by 10 percent. Brosio and
Santagata (1992, p.11) find for Italy that the share of expenditures for visiting the opera,
ballet and concerts in total expenditures has risen from 1.1 percent in 1970 to 2.6 percent
in 1988. The rise in attendance for performing art events is also documented in Baumol
and Baumol (1984). Festivals thus find themselves in the comfortable position of being in
a growing market. This does not, however, explain the growth in the number of festivals,
as opposed to regular arts venues.
2. Attracting new groups of visitors. A large share of the population rarely, if ever, attends
cultural events in opera and concert houses. Many people are overawed by the “temples of
culture”, feel insecure and unwelcome, and therefore do not even consider attending an
opera performance. This applies, in particular, to population groups with little formal
education, which are also short of cultural tradition (see Blau 1989, and DiMaggio and
Useem 1989).
The situation clearly differs for special cultural events which are broadly advertised, and
which are made attractive to new groups. This holds in particular for music festivals taking
place in “public spaces”, thus being more amenable to the great mass of the population,
and less prohibitive than the established temples of culture (see e.g. Rolfe 1992, p. 82).
Indeed, many festivals make a big effort to “go to the people” by e.g. playing in sport
stadiums or popular meeting places (such as inner-city parks)3.
3. Focusing attention. A festival seeks to attract consumers by presenting some extraordinary
cultural experience. They specialize on some particular artist (e.g. on Mozart), some period
(e.g. Renaissance music), some topic (e.g. courtly music), some genre (e.g. mannerist
music), or some type of presentation (e.g. original musical instruments). As a result, the
visitors interested in such particular forms of art come together, often from far away
locations. This development is supported by low and secularly falling travel costs.
                                                                                                                                                        
Further contributions can be found in the special issue of the Journal of Cultural Economics (Vol. 20, No.
3, 1996) devoted to the topic, with contributions by Baumol, Cowen, Peacock and Throsby.
3 A good example is the “Opera Spectacular” which tours the whole world. Its production of Aida is normally
performed in sports stadiums, and has so far attracted many millions of visitors. Open air performances
have attendances of up to 45,000 people (in Montreal), which can be attributed to its concrete visual
elements (e.g. a sphinx 15 meters high, live elephants and camels), a large number of performers (roughly
600 supernumeraries) as well as the extraordinary emphasis on acoustic quality.
5Festivals may even be compared to pilgrimages (Börsch-Supan 1993, p. 73) which also
have an aura of mysticism, and are surrounded by much commercial activity.
4. Newsworthiness. Festivals are news, and attract the attention of television, radio and the
print media, which is otherwise impossible to get to the same degree, and especially free of
charge. It is easy to get media people to report on the opening of a festival. This media
attention strengthens the festival director’s position vis à vis politicians, sponsors and
donors.
Operatic and musical performers get some media attention on opening nights but with few
exceptions, i.e. short of a scandal, the respective reports are digested by only a small
percentage of the population while the rest does not bother. Festivals offer much better
opportunities to get media attention because they present themselves every year as a
special occasion.
Closely connected to novelty is the limited duration of festivals. The restricted time raises
prospective visitors’ incentives to really attend, while a visit to the local opera house or
concert hall is easily put off in the expectation that nothing is lost thereby.
5. Low cost to visitors. Festivals are closely connected to tourism (see e.g. Getz 1989,
O’Hagan 1992, p. 65). The French characteristically like to name them “estivals”, in order
to indicate that they normally take place in the summer tourist season. It has been
econometrically estimated that as tourists have their income situation improve back home,
they increase their vacation expenditure and correspondingly demand more cultural
experiences during their stay abroad (Gapinski 1988). A considerable share of visitors
comes from out of town, from another region, and often from a foreign country.
The combination of a cultural event with tourism lowers the individuals’ cost of attending
in various respects. In the case of the increasingly popular package tours, the consumers
only have to take the initial decision and all the rest is taken care of by the travel agent. In
the case of operatic and other musical performances, where it is often burdensome to
acquire the tickets, this reduction in decision and transaction costs is substantial. Festivals
should thus be considered one input into a consumption production function (Becker
1976). The total cost of the output consumed is made up of the cost of the various inputs
which comprise, among other expenditures, the travel costs which have been secularly
declining (especially if one takes into account the reduced time input required). This
6argument, however, also holds to some extent for a combination of tourism with regular art
venues.
6. Low price elasticity of demand. The strong attraction of festivals to tourists and people
from out of town paying day-visits also affects the price elasticity of demand. Tourists tend
to compare the ticket price to expenditures for the trip as a whole. A given price rise then
appears small only and does not have much impact on demand (Thaler 1980).
The low price elasticity of demand, compared to the permanent venues, gives the managers
of festivals more leeway to increase their revenue by increasing entrance fees. It may
indeed be commonly observed that the entrance prices for festivals are often  higher than
for traditional performances. This suggests that entrance fees are more fully used as an
income source when tourist demand is higher.
7. High demand by business. Festivals offer many opportunities to make money. Indeed,
there is a large literature documenting the monetary profitability of such cultural events.
Not only do they extend to the tourist industry but also to firms catering for the production
of festivals. There is a direct benefit to the recording industry. CDs and videos of classical
music have become a huge commercial enterprise, with correspondingly high profits.
Festivals provide an excellent opportunity to hire superstars for often very large crowds of
spectators. This effect is greatly magnified if the performances are televised and
propagated by CDs and videos. The recording companies also use festivals to launch the
careers of their future stars. As festivals are less regulated than concert and opera houses,
these companies can more easily influence the program to favor the artists they have under
contract (this has been particularly noted at the Salzburg Festival, Frey 1986). The same
applies to the sponsoring activity of companies producing goods unrelated to the arts. At
festivals, they can appear more prominently and can therefore expect more publicity from
a performance for a given sum of money.
III. Supply
There are five major determinants of supply of festivals which contrast with the conditions
faced by the permanent venues and contribute to the festival boom.
71. Low production cost. The absolute cost of many festivals is certainly high. But it is low
compared to the sum of money they would require if all the resource inputs used were
attributed to them. Important resources are taken from the permanent venues and only
marginal (additional) costs are covered by the festival itself.
As most festivals are organized during the summer holidays, they can hire much of the
artistic and technical staff at marginal cost, as these persons are otherwise not employed.
They can also to a considerable extent draw on volunteers. In the United Kingdom, for
instance, almost 40 percent of the over 500 arts festivals are run by unpaid staff (Rolfe
1992, p. 1), but that source of labor is also important in virtually all festivals (see e.g.
Curtis 1990, p. 4; O’Hagan and Purdy 1993, p. 161). The locations at which the festivals
play are often “public” (they belong to the state or the church) and can be rented at a
nominal charge, and are frequently free (Rolfe 1992, p. 62; Galeotti 1992, p. 133). This
makes sense, as many of these venues are otherwise unused, as for example the Roman
theatres in which some festivals (Verona and Orange are well-known cases in point) take
place.
2. More scope for artistic creativity. Permanent opera houses and orchestras are strongly
bound by the clientele they have to cater for. They often find it impossible to interpret
classical plays in a new form, and even more to perform modern and/or unknown plays,
because they risk losing their regular customers. The holders of season tickets with mostly
conservative taste are, moreover, strongly interested in what is presented and form a
powerful lobby, which can exert considerable pressure on the managers and the subsidy-
giving politicians if they are dissatisfied with “their” opera house or orchestras. As a
consequence, the directors have little possibility of fulfilling their artistic conceptions of
originality.
In contrast, independently organized festivals provide a possibility of exhibiting artistic
creativity. Festivals may well specialize in an audience honoring unorthodoxy, excellence
and special tastes. While a permanent opera house or orchestra only performing
contemporary plays and music comes under heavy pressure from their established
clientele, and is quickly forced by the subsidizing politicians to conform to broader tastes,
a festival exclusively devoted to such contemporary art may well prosper.
83. Evading government and trade union regulations. Cultural institutions’ freedom to act is
restricted by two major institutions, the government and the trade unions4.
(a) Administrative restrictions. In continental Europe, establishments of classical music
and operas, as well as of art museums, are to a large extent either directly part of the
public administration, or at least have to follow the administrative rules of the public
sector as they are heavily subsidized by it. In particular, they are subject to the “non-
affectation principle”, according to which all expenditures are covered by the public
budget, and in return all the revenue goes to the public treasury. All revenue thereby
gained is “taxed” by the public treasury at one hundred percent as the subsidy is
correspondingly reduced. Indeed, the effort to gain own revenues is taxed at more than
one hundred percent in the long run, because the budgetary authorities become aware
of the money-earning potential and correspondingly tend to reduce future subsidies.
As a result, arts institutions (as well as all other governmental units) have no incentive
to gain revenue by their own efforts, e.g. by ticket sales or income from auxiliary
activities, such as recordings of operatic and musical performances.
Many festivals are organized as private enterprises, in which public bodies are at best
one of several members. As a consequence, the directors of music festivals do not
have to conform to administrative regulations, and in particular do not have to transfer
surpluses to the public treasury, but can use them in a way they find sensible, above all
to invest them in innovative features of their festival. The directors risk losing their
degree of freedom to the extent they accept, and become dependent on, public
subsidies, in which case the festival’s possibility of engaging in artistic originality is
reduced to the low level corresponding to established opera houses and orchestras.
(b) Employment restrictions. One of the most stringent public regulations imposed on art
institutions pertains to government sector employment. The virtual impossibility of
dismissing inefficient or downright destructive employees, promoting and paying
employees according to performance, and adjusting working hours to needs, are major
factors reducing creative endeavors, and turning art institutions into mere
bureaucracies. Additional regulations have been pushed through by the trade unions,
and are often fully supported by the government. Festivals make it possible to evade at
                                                
4 This argument especially applies to Europe. In the United States, where generally less regulations are
imposed on cultural institutions (at least compared to other institutions), the incentive to evade regulations
9least some employment restrictions, especially as most of the respective employees are
only part-time and temporary, not union members, and therefore not legally bound by
trade union regulations.
4. More sponsoring. Politicians and public officials have a pronounced interest in festivals.
They not only respond to the respective demands of the arts world and the local business
community, but it gives them an excellent opportunity of appearing in the media as
“patrons of the arts” (with tax payers’ money).
Business is also more prepared to sponsor festivals than regular activities where legal
provisions often hinder sponsoring. The most important reason is certainly not only the
higher media attention of these events and their particular contribution, but also that an
individual firm has more control over the funds contributed, and sees less of it wasted by
an inefficient bureaucracy than in opera houses. Sponsors “want a well-defined, high-
quality event aimed at specific audience” (The Economist, 5 Aug. 1989). For the reasons
given above, the corporate sponsors also feel that their contributions add to cultural output,
and do not simply induce the government to provide less subsidies.
5. Career enhancement. As a result of increased internationalization, particularly with
European unification, many of the top positions in opera houses and orchestras are open to
foreign competition. The normal career pattern has thus changed from staying all one’s
life in one house, and reaching a senior position by internal promotion. In order to
successfully compete in this changed setting, the directors have to make themselves
internationally known. An excellent means is to actively participate in festival.
The discussion has shown that festivals have substantial possibilities to be artistically
innovative and at the same time economically successful. A major reason is that festivals are
less bound by restrictions than are the traditional venues. However, government interventions
have a perennial tendency to undermine these advantages. In particular, the way of
subsidizing festivals may easily distort the incentives to be artistically innovative. This
tendency is strengthened by the fact that accepting government subsidies in general means
that the recipient festivals have to conform to the many restrictions going with public
activities. The next section demonstrates for the case of the Salzburg Festival that this danger
                                                                                                                                                        
is lower. The empirical picture is consistent with that observation: fewer festivals take place in the U.S. than
10
is indeed real, and that the outcome may well be that festivals become as inflexible as the
traditional venues.
IV. Problems of Government Intervention
As the general discussion of festivals has indicated, the government support of art and culture
is not without problems. The Salzburg Festival (an extensive discussion from the economic
point of view is given in Frey 1986) is taken as a prominent example. A law has been
promulgated forcing the state to carry whatever deficit arises. The total deficit is covered
jointly by the Austrian government, the Salzburg province and the city of Salzburg. The
budget restrictions on the Salzburg Festival fund (with four directors and a president) are
therefore extremely weak. Effective restrictions on deficit coverage can only arise if the
financing possibilities of all the bodies subsidizing the festival were no longer adequate, and
the law was correspondingly amended. Of course, not even in that case is the money just
handed out to the Festival. Formally, it is decided by the four bodies mentioned above. Yet
these bodies are constrained by the law requiring them to cover the deficit. Also, as the deficit
concerns all four of them, it has the nature of a “public good”: a particular body has only
muted incentives to try to reduce the deficit. The benefits of such activity accrue to all while
the considerable costs in terms of conflicts engendered fall on the body trying to reduce the
deficit. Finally, the individual members of these bodies, mainly politicians and bureaucrats,
have no incentive to fight for a reduction in the subsidy. They personally benefit from good
relationships with the Festival organizers as they receive free entrance tickets and are invited
to the trendy social occasions.
As a consequence of these extremely favorable conditions for the festival fund, its directorate
pursues a remarkable redistributive policy. The Austrian taxpayer is burdened with financing
the subsidies, while the benefits are divided among the directorate, the employees, the artists
and a selected group of visitors. The wide discretionary room of the directors is reflected in
the typical rent-seeking activities of the festival:
1. Entrance tickets are sold at prices lying substantially below the equilibrium price, with the
consequence that demand constantly exceeds supply. For example, in 1981/2, when the
number of persons attending amounted to 175,000, a total of 35,000 requests for tickets
                                                                                                                                                        
in Europe (see Frey 1994).
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were rejected. In this way, the directorate can claim to be charging “socially appropriate”
prices, which in turn is good for their prestige. But the resulting costs have to be borne by
the anonymous taxpayer. The directorate is, moreover, able to hand out tickets, which are
otherwise hard, or impossible, to obtain for interested demanders, in a discriminatory
fashion. The main recipients of these tickets are festival administration workers, press-
persons and individuals from whom political support to the festival may be expected. The
emergence of a black market in tickets, moreover, provides a fair-sized group (including
hotel employees) with an opportunity to make money by selling the tickets at a higher
price than the official price.
2. The quasi-automatic coverage of deficits allows artists and administration workers to
receive considerably higher wages than elsewhere, i.e. pure rents are paid. This is evident
from Table 1, which gives a comparison of wages for administrative staff of the  Salzburg
Festival and the Bundestheater in Vienna. It should be noted that the wages have been
made comparable by the Austrian Court of Accounts (Oesterreichischer Rechnungshof
1984, 1988) – except that the Salzburg Festival plays only for a fraction of the time the
Bundestheater does. The rents are not only paid in the form of excessively high current
monetary incomes, but also in the form of additional retirement pension entitlements and a
number of fringe benefits (gifts, subsidized travel, etc.).
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Table 1: Wages of Administrative Staff of the Salzburg Festival and the Vienna Bundestheater (with
functionally equivalent duties); 1981-82, in Austrian Schillings.
Administrative area Salzburg Bundestheater
Ticket sales 814,000 314,000
Buildings 821,000 467,000
Press Office 775,000 434,000
Technical section 797,000 679,000
Note: The Salzburg Festival lasts five weeks, while the Bundestheater plays for ten months. The wages indicated have not
been adjusted accordingly.
Source: Oesterreichischer Rechnungshof 1984, section 1.31.1.
3. The organizers of the Festival have little incentive to keep down costs and to aim at an
efficient management. As a result there is widespread and considerable inefficiency and
waste. A drive for efficiency would create serious conflicts with the artists and other
employees while the cost savings only result in a reduction of the size of the subsidy
received. Such a reduction is of little or no benefit to the Festival directors. Rather, with
respect to their prestige and careers they greatly benefit from hiring the best possible artists
and mounting highly acclaimed performances irrespective of costs. As the Rechnungshof
stated in its report (RH 1984, 1.15.3), the organizers choose the plays to be performed
independent of the expected monetary net return, and sometimes even violating obvious
cost considerations.
V. Conclusions
The purpose of the discussion was to show that festivals offer great artistic and economic
opportunities, but that at the same time these opportunities are also easy to destroy. There are
two policy conclusions to be drawn:
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1. The government subsidies must be given with great care. From the very beginning it has to
be carefully checked whether a planned festival needs any monetary subsidies at all.
Alternative ways of support may be not only economically more efficient but also be
preferable from the artistic point of view. In particular, the government can support a
festival by allowing performances in public spaces and public venues. As most of them are
little or not used alternatively, they should be given at a nominal or zero charge.
In case a monetary subsidy is in order, the incentive of the organizers should not be
destroyed. They must be motivated to produce as large total social benefits as possible
while keeping total social costs as low as possible. Total social benefits of course do not
solely consist in monetary revenues but in the aggregate willingness to pay for the festival.
Also, the purpose cannot be to minimize monetary cost but negative external effects (e.g.
in terms of noise and additional traffic induced) have also to be considered.
Under no circumstance should the public subsidies work against an effort by the festival
organizers to produce as much commercial revenue as possible without reducing artistic
quality. In particular, they should not be punished by a reduction in the subsidy when they
are able to raise revenue. Rather, such a laudable effort should be rewarded by increasing
the subsidy. Clearly, such a policy rule stands against the teachings of traditional public
finance as well as against practice. Nevertheless, it is compatible with an approach which
takes the organizers’ incentives into account.
2. The government should interfere as little as possible in the organization of festivals. An
effort should be made to prevent the many restrictions hampering traditional venues from
applying to festivals. Thus the rules governing the working hours of the artistic,
administrative and, above all, technical staff should be adjusted to the special occasion,
and the same should apply to pay scales.
Provided these two policy conclusions are observed, festivals have a chance to stay
innovative and to keep adding to the cultural life of a large, and often disregarded, part of the
population.
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